RECORD VERSION

STATEMENT BY

THE HONORABLE JOHN M. MCHUGH SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

AND

GENERAL RAYMOND T. ODIERNO CHIEF OF STAFF UNITED STATES ARMY

BEFORE THE


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The Strategic Context

Our Nation has weathered difficult circumstances since the attacks on 9/11, yet we have met every challenge. The mission in Iraq has ended responsibly, continued progress in Afghanistan is enabling a transition to Afghan security responsibility and targeted counterterrorism efforts have significantly weakened al Qaeda and degraded its leadership. In all these endeavors, the Army has played a leading role.

As President Barack Obama stated in introducing his new national defense priorities, the country is at a turning point after a decade of war and considerable increases in defense spending. Even as large-scale military campaigns recede, the Nation will still face a growing array of security challenges. These new priorities focus on the continuing threat of violent extremism, the proliferation of lethal weapons and materials, the destabilizing behavior of Iran and North Korea, the rise of new powers across Asia and an era of uncertainty in the Middle East.

On top of that, our Nation confronts a serious deficit and debt problem (in itself a national security risk) that will squeeze future Army budgets. However, declining defense budgets do not nullify our obligation to provide enough capacity and maintain a highly ready force that is sufficiently modernized to provide a leaner, adaptive, flexible and integrated force that offers the President a significant number of options along the spectrum of conflict.

Today the U.S. Army is the best-trained, best-equipped and best-led combat-tested force in the world. Today's Soldiers have achieved a level of professionalism, combat experience and civil and military expertise that is an invaluable national asset. Our warriors have accomplished every assigned task they have been given. But all we have accomplished in building this magnificent force can be squandered if we are not careful. We are an Army in transition, and we look to Congress to assist us in the difficult work to build the Army of 2020.

America's Army–The Nation's Force of Decisive Action Every day, America's Army is making a positive difference in the world during one of the most challenging times in our history. Although stressed and stretched, the United States Army remains the most agile, adaptable and capable force in the world. Ours is an Army that reflects America's diversity and represents the time-honored values that built our Nation: hard work, duty, selflessness, determination, honor and compassion.

Today, less than one-half of 1 percent of Americans serve in the Army. As members of one of our Nation's oldest and most enduring institutions, these volunteers play an indispensible role in guarding U.S. national interests at home and abroad. Young men and women who want to make a difference in this world want to be part of our Army, which is why even after a decade of conflict, we continue to fill our ranks with the best the Nation has to offer. They have earned the gratitude, trust and admiration of an appreciative people for their extraordinary accomplishments.

2011–The Army in Transition Over the past year, the Army has concluded its mission in Iraq and commenced the drawdown of surge forces in Afghanistan while transferring responsibility to Afghan forces. We are beginning reductions in endstrength to face budgetary realities. We are also undertaking efforts to rebalance force structure and make investment decisions that will shape the Army of 2020– all during a

time of war. These transformational efforts are both significant and unprecedented. As the President's new national defense priorities are implemented, the Army will continue its transition to a smaller yet capable force fully prepared to conduct the full range of operations worldwide.

Operation Enduring Freedom A decade into the war in Afghanistan, the Army continues to play a leading role in defending our national security interests in this vital theater. At the start of the war, following the attacks on 9/11, elements of Army Special Operations Forces led efforts on the ground to bring al Qaeda members to justice and remove the Taliban from power, thereby denying a safe haven to terrorists. With more than 70,000 Soldiers in Afghanistan at peak strength in 2011, the Army's brigade combat teams conducted operations ranging from stability to counterinsurgency.

Today, over 63,000 Army Soldiers in both general purpose and special operations units continue to conduct a wide range of missions across Afghanistan country to help Afghan citizens lay the foundation for lasting security. Simultaneously, the Army provided essential logistics capabilities to sustain the land-locked Afghan theater. In fact, only America's Army could provide the necessary theater logistics, transportation, medical and communications infrastructure capable of supporting Joint and Combined forces for an operation of this size and complexity.

Since the beginning of combat operations in Afghanistan, Soldiers have earned 5,437 valor awards, including 241 Silver Stars and 8 Distinguished Service Crosses. Four Soldiers have been awarded the Medal of Honor for their heroic actions: Sergeant First Class Jared C. Monti, Staff Sergeant Salvatore A. Giunta, Staff Sergeant Robert J. Miller and Staff Sergeant Leroy A. Petry. They exemplify the courage, commitment and sacrifice of all the men and women who have served in this conflict.

Operation New Dawn In December 2011, the Army concluded more than 8 years of combat and stability operations in Iraq. Initially, powerful and agile forces liberated Iraq and then adapted to the new demand of suppressing the post-invasion insurgencies. Indeed, when the Nation needed a sustained effort to achieve its strategic objectives, the Army answered the call, adjusting its deployment tours from 12 to 15 months to enable a decisive surge in forces. Army units trained and equipped Iraq Security Forces, and when the mission changed, the Army executed the extremely difficult tasks of redeploying people and retrograding equipment to ensure future readiness.

Over one million Soldiers and Department of the Army Civilians served courageously in Iraq. They were essential to freeing more than 25 million Iraqi people from the tyranny of a brutal dictator, putting Iraq's future in the hands of its people and removing a national security threat to the United States.

Success came at a great cost in blood and treasure. But even during the most dire times, our Soldiers never wavered. Their heroic actions earned 8,238 awards for valor, including 408 Silver Stars and 16 Distinguished Service Crosses. Two Medals of Honor were awarded posthumously to Sergeant First Class Paul R. Smith and Private First Class Ross A. McGinnis.

Other Global Commitments In addition to the Army's unprecedented contributions in Afghanistan and Iraq, we have continued to conduct operations across the globe to prevent conflict, shape the environment and win decisively. Nearly 20,000 Soldiers remain stationed on the Korean peninsula, providing a credible deterrent and investing in our partnership with the Republic of Korea Army. Simultaneously, Army Special Operations Soldiers in the Pacific region continue to provide advice and support to the Philippine Armed Forces, enhancing our robust alliance. Both are examples of

strategic investments in a region that is home to 7 of the world's 10 largest armies. (In fact, in most countries around the world, the army is the dominant defense force.) And U.S. Soldiers continue to serve in places such as the Sinai, Guantanamo Bay, Bosnia, Kosovo and the Horn of Africa, developing and maintaining relationships on six of the world's seven continents.

<u>Defense Support of Civil Authorities</u> Over the past year, the Army has continued to provide instrumental support to civil authorities. The Army's reserve component proved to be one of our great strengths for these missions, giving the force depth and flexibility. The National Guard provides a distinctive capability for the Nation. When floods, wildfires and tornados struck from the Midwest to the South over the span of a few days in spring 2011, more than 900 National Guard Soldiers supplied a coordinated response to address citizens' needs across the affected region. Similarly, when Hurricane Irene knocked out power and flooded towns across the Northeast in the summer of 2011, nearly 10,000 National Guard Soldiers and Airmen across 13 States delivered critical services to sustain the region through the crisis.

In addition to ongoing counterdrug operations, approximately 1,200 National Guard Soldiers and Airmen supported the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in 4 States along the southwest U.S. border by providing entry identification and analysis to disrupt criminal networks and activities.

Army Special Operations Forces To conduct unified land operations, the U.S. Army fields a suite of Special Operations capabilities that range from the world's finest precision strike and special warfare forces to the world's most lethal combined arms maneuver formations. The Army draws from across its broad set of capabilities to provide the Joint commander the blend of Army assets required to ensure mission accomplishment. True in Afghanistan today, Army Special Operations Forces are also

providing assistance in the Philippines, Yemen, the Arabian Gulf, Lebanon, Colombia, the African Trans-Sahel and across the Caribbean and Central America. As Army regular forces become available, they will increasingly integrate with Army Special Operations Forces to promote trust and interoperability with allies and build partner nation capacity where mutual interests are at risk from internal or external enemies.

Fiscal Environment

<u>Challenges of Reduced Budget</u> Today's global fiscal environment is driving defense budgets down for our partners and allies, as well as our Nation. Historically, defense spending has been cyclic with significant reductions following the end of major conflicts. The Army understands it cannot be immune to these fiscal realities and must be part of the solution. Our focus areas for the FY 13 budget demonstrate our concerted effort to establish clear priorities that give the Nation a ready and capable Army while being good stewards of all our resources.

Challenges of Continuing Resolutions Timely and predictable funding enables the Army to plan, resource and manage the programs that produce a trained and ready force. The Army very much appreciates that Congress approved the FY 12 budget earlier than had been the case in recent years when we were forced to operate for long stretches under continuing resolutions. Long-term continuing resolutions force the Army to slow its spending, freeze production rates and delay the start of new programs. Such delays pose a risk to the Army's operational readiness and investment strategy. We stand ready to help Congress once again pass defense bills in a timely manner.

Security Environment A series of powerful global trends continue to shape the current and future strategic environment: increased demand for dwindling resources,

persistent regional conflict, empowered non-state actors, the continuing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and failed states. We anticipate a myriad of hybrid threats that incorporate regular and irregular warfare, terrorism and criminality. We also face cyber-threats to an increasingly critical and vulnerable information technology infrastructure and the destabilizing effect of global economic downturns. Together, these trends create a complex and unpredictable environment in all of the Army's operational domains: land, sea, air, space and cyberspace.

Implications for America's Army

Role of the Army: Prevent, Shape, Win In the uncertain environment our country faces, the Army remains central to our Nation's defense as part of the Joint Force. No major conflict has been won without boots on the ground. Listed below are the three essential roles the Army must play.

First, our Army must *prevent* conflict just as we did during the Cold War. Prevention is most effective when adversaries are convinced that conflict with your force would be imprudent. The Army's ability to win any fight across the full range of operations as part of a Joint Force must never be open to challenge. It must be clear that we will fight and win, which requires a force with sufficient capacity, readiness and modernization. That means quality Soldiers; agile, adaptive leaders; versatile units; realistic training and modern equipment. Prevention is achieved through credible readiness, sometimes requiring decisive action. Our Army must continue to be a credible force around the globe to prevent miscalculations by those who would test us.

Second, our Army must help **shape** the international environment to enable our Combatant Commanders to assure our friends and contain our enemies. We do that by engaging with our partners, fostering mutual understanding through military-to-military contacts and helping them build the capacity to defend themselves. These actions are

an investment in the future that the Nation cannot afford to forego. We must cultivate positive relationships before they are needed and be a reliable, consistent and respectful partner to others.

Finally, the Army must be ready to *win* decisively and dominantly. Nothing else approaches what is achieved by winning, and the consequences of losing at war are usually catastrophic. With so much at stake, the American people will expect what they have always expected of us—decisive victory. The Army must never enter into a terrible endeavor such as war unprepared. Although we may still win, it will be more expensive, cost more lives and require more time.

In addition to being trained, sized and equipped to win decisively in the more traditional operational domains, the Army also will require robust capability in cyberspace. As the past decade of conflict has demonstrated, the information environment has changed the way we fight. Military and cyberspace operations have converged, and protecting information in cyberspace is more essential than ever to how our Army fights. The advantage will go to those able to maintain the freedom to operate and able to gain, protect and exploit information in the contested cyberspace domain. The Army must be dominant in both the land and cyberspace domains.

Smaller but Reversible As our new national defense priorities drives us to a smaller Army, we must avoid the historical pattern of drawing down too fast or risk losing leadership and capabilities, making it much harder to expand again when needed. It is critical that the Army be able to rapidly expand to meet large unexpected contingencies, and four components are key to that ability. First, the Army must maintain a strong cadre of noncommissioned and mid-grade officers to form the core of new formations when needed. Second, we will make significant investments in Army Special Operations Forces to increase their capabilities and provide the President with

more options. Third, it will require ready and accessible Army National Guard and Army Reserve forces. The Army's reserve component has proven essential in contingency operations around the world. From Kosovo, the Sinai and Horn of Africa to Afghanistan and Iraq, homeland defense along America's southwest border, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief at home and abroad, the Army National Guard and Army Reserve have evolved into indispensible parts of our operational force and we will continue to rely on them to provide depth and versatility to meet the complex demands of the future. The fourth critical component of the Army's ability to expand is the Nation's industrial base. We rely on the industrial base to perform research and development and to design, produce and maintain our weapons systems, components and parts. It must be capable of rapidly expanding to meet a large demand. Reversibility is the *sine qua non* to ensuring that the Army can rapidly grow when our Nation calls.

The Army's Focus Areas

Support to Operations in Afghanistan

Our immediate focus remains on providing the best trained and most ready land forces in the world to win the current fight while maintaining responsiveness for unforeseen contingencies. The support of the American people is paramount to our success. We must fulfill our responsibilities to them without draining their goodwill and treasure.

Despite continued challenges and tough conditions, our forces are making measureable progress against an adaptive enemy. Army Security Force Assistance Teams continue to train both Afghan National Army forces (now almost 180,000 strong) and Afghan National Police forces (made up of nearly 144,000 men and women in uniform). The increased capability of Afghan Security Forces is allowing security of the

region to be turned back over to the government of Afghanistan district by district.

During the coming year we must continue to provide trained and ready forces equipped to support operations. We remain focused on doing everything we can to ensure that we meet our national objectives and provide what our brave men and women in the field need to succeed.

In Afghanistan, the commitment and performance of our Soldiers and Civilians continues to be nothing short of extraordinary. Not only have they taken the fight to our enemies, but they have proven equally effective as emissaries. Our investment in leader development prepared them to operate in this demanding environment.

In the coming year we will continue to increase the Afghan lead of security responsibilities, target key insurgent leaders, retain and expand secure areas and help Afghan National Security Forces earn the support of the people through improved security capacity and capability. Because of its geography, distance, infrastructure and harsh environment, the difficulty and complexity of the drawdown in Afghanistan will exceed that in Iraq. The United States Army is the only organization in the world with the capability to plan and execute a logistical operation this complex and difficult.

The Army places great emphasis on properly maintaining its equipment to restore readiness to the force and ensure it is prepared to meet Combatant Commander requirements. The Army reset program reverses the effects of combat stress and restores equipment to a high level of combat capability to conduct future operations. Reset is a lengthy process, and even after the drawdown from Afghanistan is complete, the Army will require funding for 2 to 3 years to reset our equipment from the harsh demands of war.

Responsible Stewardship

Institutional Army Transformation The drive to reform the Institutional Army is about doing things better, smarter and faster while taking advantage of available technology, knowledge and experience. Our Institutional Army—the part of the Army that trains, educates and supports Army forces worldwide—will become more flexible by improving our ability to quickly adapt to changing environments, missions and priorities. The Institutional Army is also working to rapidly address the demands placed on the organization by the current and future operational environments. It performed magnificently to produce trained and ready forces, even while seeking to adapt institutional business processes.

Further, the Army is working to provide "readiness at best value" to help us live within the constraints imposed by the national and global economic situation. In short, the need to reform the Army's institutional management processes and develop an integrated management system has never been more urgent. To enhance organizational adaptive capacity while shepherding our resources, the Army initiated a number of efforts, such as the Army Financial Improvement Plan, which will enable the Army to achieve full auditability by FY17.

Acquisition Reform As a result of uncertain funding, insufficient contract oversight and an ineffective requirement determination process, the Army has initiated a significant reform of the way we develop and acquire our products and weapons. As part of this initiative, we have taken steps toward improvement through a series of capability portfolio reviews. These platforms serve to revalidate, modify or terminate programs based on the Army's need and the affordability of the program. We have also started to fix an inefficient procurement system that too often wastes precious resources and fails to provide needed systems in a timely manner. For example, the Army

commissioned a comprehensive review of our acquisition system that, based on the findings and recommendations, produced a blueprint for acquisition reform. These changes fall into four broad areas:

- realignment of acquisition requirements combined with a sharper focus on the needed competencies of acquisition professionals;
- expansion of stakeholder (acquisition professional and Soldier end-user)
 participation in developing requirements, planning and acquisition solicitation;
- reappraisal and streamlining of acquisition strategies and the attendant risk in such streamlining; and
- improvement in the selection, development and accountability of the people involved in the acquisition process.

We are implementing these recommendations as part of our broader effort to reform the Institutional Army.

Army Energy Security Supplying energy to our Army around the world is increasingly challenging, expensive and dangerous. The Army must consider energy in all activities to reduce demand, increase efficiency, obtain alternative sources and create a culture of energy accountability. Energy security is an imperative that can be described in two categories, operational and garrison.

Operational energy is the energy and associated systems, information and processes required to train, move and sustain forces and systems for military operations. The Army is developing new doctrine, policies, plans and technologies that will improve the management and use of operational energy to better support Soldiers' needs. Less energy efficient systems in an operational environment require more fuel, increasing the number of fuel convoys and thus risking more lives and limiting our flexibility.

Garrison energy is the energy required to power Army bases and conduct Soldier training. Dependence on fossil fuels and a vulnerable electric power grid jeopardize the security of Army operating bases and mission capabilities. The impact of increasing energy prices is a decrease in the quantity and quality of training the Army can conduct.

Initiatives such as cool roofs, solar power, stormwater management and water efficiency are positive steps toward addressing the challenges of energy security in the operational and garrison environments. Innovative and adaptive leaders, seeking ways to increase energy efficiency and implement renewable and alternate sources of energy, are key to saving lives and increasing the Army's flexibility by reducing costs.

A Leaner Army

The Army is committed to providing Combatant Commanders with the capabilities, capacity and diversity needed to be successful across a wide range of operations. With a leaner Army, we have to prioritize and also remain capable of meeting a wide range of security requirements. We will reduce in a manner that preserves our readiness and avoids any hollowing of the force. To satisfy this enduring requirement, we have three rheostats that must be continuously assessed and adjusted: end strength/force structure, readiness and modernization. We will balance these three foundational

imperatives throughout the next several years to provide Combatant Commanders trained and ready forces in support of Joint Force 2020.

Force Structure and Force Design The Army will maintain a versatile mix of tailorable and networked organizations, operating on a rotational cycle, to continue providing a sustained flow of trained and ready forces for the full range of military operations. This will give Combatant Commanders a hedge against unexpected contingencies and enable a sustainable tempo for our all-volunteer force. Over the next five years, the Army will decrease its end-strength from a peak authorized strength of about 570,000 to 490,000 Active Army, 358,000 to 353,500 Army National Guard and 206,000 to 205,000 Army Reserve Soldiers as directed. Reducing our end strength over a deliberate ramp through the end of fiscal year 2017 allows the Army to take care of Soldiers, Families, and Civilians; to continue meeting our commitments in Afghanistan; and to facilitate reversibility in an uncertain strategic environment.

An unpredictable and dynamic global security environment requires the Army, as a force in transition, to adjust and reduce its size while remaining flexible, capable and ready to meet the Nation's requirements and maintaining an ability to reverse course to readily expand if necessary. In accordance with the new defense priorities, the Army of 2020 must have a versatile mix of capabilities, formations and equipment that is lethal, agile, adaptable and responsive. As the Army transitions from the current force to a leaner force, it will do so while remaining engaged in the current conflicts. The Army will prioritize force structure and committed assets in the Pacific Region and the Middle East, and will shape the future force to support the Army's requirements as part of the Joint Force to fulfill the Nation's strategic and operational commitments. The Army will optimize force structure to maintain reversibility, and achieve maximum operational strategic flexibility. Today we plan on reducing at least 8 active component Brigade Combat Teams, however, we continue to assess the design and mix of these modular formations based upon the lessons from the last ten years of combat. This analysis

may lead to a decision to reorganize BCTs into more capable and robust formations, requiring further BCT reductions in order to increase overall versatility and agility for tomorrow's security challenges.

As the Army's active component reduces in size, the composition of combat support and combat service support enablers in the active and reserve components will be adjusted to give the Army the ability to conduct sustained operations, and to mitigate risk. The Army will continue to rely on the reserve components to provide key enablers and operational depth. An operational reserve comprised of a discrete set of capabilities with an enhanced level of readiness will be essential. This force will consist of three elements: select combat formations prepared to respond to crisis; combat support and combat service support enablers employed early in support of operational plans; and forces aligned to support steady-state Combatant Commander requirements. Ensured access to the reserve component is essential to providing the operational depth and flexibility Combatant Commanders require. During the transition, we must manage our people carefully to neither compromise readiness nor break faith with those who have served the Nation so well.

Readiness Army unit readiness is measured by the level of its manning, training and equipping. The current Army force generation model, known as ARFORGEN, has served us well in meeting the requirements for Iraq and Afghanistan; however, we will adapt it to ensure we meet future Combatant Commander requirements in the uncertain, complex strategic environment. We envision a progressive readiness model for most active and reserve component early deploying units which will align forces for Combatant Commanders. Because of their unique capabilities, our low density, high demand units do not lend themselves to a rotational pool like ARFORGEN. These units must be sustained in a constant readiness model.

The Strength of Our Army is Our Soldiers Soldiers and Families form the foundation of unit readiness. People are the Army, and our enduring priority is to preserve the high-quality, all-volunteer force —the essential element of our strength. The Army has gained the trust of the American public more than at any other time in recent history while developing a force that is very different from what it was a few short years ago. Our Army must maintain the public's trust while our Nation fulfills its responsibilities toward Soldiers and their Families. The United States Army is unique from other professions because our core attributes are derived from American values, the Constitution and law. Today's Army is building on a successful foundation with the trust, respect and support of the American people. This foundation, and our enduring commitment to strengthening our Army Profession, will improve our force as it adapts to meet the Nation's evolving needs.

The Army is the Nation's preeminent leadership experience. The all-volunteer force is our greatest strategic asset, providing depth, versatility and unmatched experience to the Joint Force. We must continue to train, develop and retain adaptive leaders and maintain this combat-seasoned, all-volunteer force of professionals. We will continue to adjust in order to prepare our leaders for more dynamic and complex future environments. Our leader development model is an adaptive, continuous and progressive process grounded in Army values. We grow Soldiers and Army Civilians into competent and confident leaders capable of decisive action. We must give our leaders broadening opportunities to better prepare them for the myriad challenges they will encounter. In addition, we must reinvigorate unit training, training management skills and leader development to build versatile units. By providing our leaders with the professional challenges they expect, we will retain them and nurture their adaptive spirit.

Our challenge in the coming years is not just about attracting and selecting the best available candidates to be Army professionals. We must also engage and develop our quality, combat experienced leaders so that we keep them, and they, in turn, train the

next generation of Army professionals. During the last decade of war, we have given our young leaders unprecedented flexibility and authority to operate effectively on the battlefield. We will prepare for tomorrow by building on that investment and ensuring that opportunities for creativity, leadership and advancement exist throughout the Army.

We must draw down wisely to avoid stifling the health of the force or breaking faith with our Soldiers, Civilians and Families. Excessive cuts would create high risk in our ability to sustain readiness. We must avoid our historical pattern of drawing down too much or too fast and risk losing the leadership, technical skills and combat experience that cannot be easily reclaimed. We must identify and safeguard key programs in education, leader development, health care, quality of life and retirement—programs critical to retaining our Soldiers.

The Strength of Our Soldiers is Our Families In order to ensure a relevant and ready all-volunteer force, the Army will continue to invest heavily in our Soldier and Family programs. The Army Family Covenant expresses the Army's commitment to care for Soldiers and their Families by providing a strong, supportive environment that enhances their strength and resilience and helps them to thrive. The Covenant focuses on programs, services and initiatives essential to preserving an all-volunteer force and institutionalizes the Army's commitment to provide Soldiers and their Families a quality of life commensurate with their service to the Nation. Through the Covenant, the Army is improving the delivery of Soldier and Family programs and services, sustaining accessibility to quality health care, and promoting education and employment opportunities for Family members. We are sustaining high-quality housing; ensuring excellence in school support, youth services and child care; and maintaining quality recreation services for Soldiers and Family members as they serve on the Nation's behalf around the world. We will not walk away from our commitment to our Families; however, a different fiscal reality requires us to review our investments and eliminate

redundant and poor performing programs while sustaining those that are high performing and most beneficial to our Families.

Honoring Service We must fulfill our moral obligation to the health, welfare and care of our Soldiers, Civilians and Families. The effects of more than 10 years of war and inadequate dwell time at home has resulted in a cumulative stress on Soldiers, Families and communities that has significant implications for the Army and our Nation. We have implemented an unprecedented number of personnel-focused programs, including Comprehensive Soldier Fitness; Wounded Warrior Program; and Health Promotion, Risk Reduction and Suicide Prevention, to ensure the continued care, support and services that sustain the high quality of our force.

Sexual harassment and sexual assault are inconsistent with the Army's values and our profession. It is imperative that we foster a climate where such misconduct is not tolerated and the dignity of our Soldiers, Civilians and Family members is respected and protected. Army Leaders are focused on the urgency of this issue and the level of commitment required to affect cultural change and combat this crime. We are aggressively implementing and expanding the Army's comprehensive Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) Program. The SHARP program is aimed at command prevention efforts at all levels, educating all members of our Army family, training our first responder professionals and supporting victims while reducing the stigma of reporting. One incident of this type of unwarranted and abusive behavior is one too many. The Army is committed to ensuring leadership at all levels is engaged in preventing sexual assault and harassment, and to appropriately holding offenders accountable.

The Army continues to invest heavily in better understanding traumatic brain injury and post-traumatic stress, the invisible signature wounds of our recent wars. We have

developed and implemented new prevention and treatment protocols, and we are in the third year of our 5-year partnership with the National Institute of Mental Health to identify the factors that help protect a Soldier's mental health and those that put it at risk.

We have also started to reduce the length of deployments to 9 months for many of our units at the division level and below, which we believe will alleviate significant pressure on our Soldiers and their Families. We are doubling our efforts to ensure that each of our more than 18,000 Soldiers currently enrolled in the Integrated Disability Evaluation System is carefully examined to determine whether he or she should return to civilian life or continue military service. A recent initiative between the Department of Defense and U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs – the Integrated Disability Evaluation System integrates formerly separate programs – resulting in a streamlined, more efficient process for servicemembers, which will reduce the backlog of Soldiers awaiting benefits.

As we draw down the Army, we must honor our veterans with the very best support, care and services they deserve as they make the transition from military service to civilian life. We are committed to our Soldiers and their Families, who are the strength of the Army. At the same time, the Army is focused on wisely managing our resources in the health care arena. The Army supports Defense Department proposals to further reduce the rate of growth in health care costs – proposals that are aligned with our priorities. TRICARE is a superb health benefit – one of the best in the country and appropriately so. Just as in all areas of the defense budget, we need to make decisions that preserve a strong benefit yet reflect the fiscal realities of the times. The proposals take care to exempt populations who have made the greatest sacrifices – those who are medically retired and those families who have lost their loved one while serving on active duty. The changes proposed are also adjusted to reflect lower adjustments for those retirees with lower retirement pay. And, most importantly, the Department

continues to provide resources that improve the overall health system for our soldiers and their families.

The Army is using the Health Promotion and Risk Reduction FY 11 Campaign Plan to holistically promote health and reduce risk. The Campaign Plan incorporates findings and recommendations from Department of Defense and Army reports regarding health promotion, risk reduction and suicide prevention. Health promotion and risk reduction activities are essential to sustain the force under the current operational tempo and reset our Army.

Modernization The Army has global responsibilities requiring large technological advantages to prevail decisively in combat. Just as pilots and sailors seek supremacy in the air and on the seas, Soldiers must dominate their enemies on land. Modernizing, especially as end-strength is reduced, is the key to ensuring that our dominance continues.

The Army is setting priorities and making prudent choices to provide the best possible force for the Nation within the resources available. We are developing and fielding a versatile and affordable mix of equipment to enable us to succeed in the full range of missions and maintain a decisive advantage over our enemies. To meet the challenges of an evolving strategic and fiscal environment, our strategy is based on three tenets: integrated capability portfolios, incremental modernization and leveraging the Army Force Generation cycle.

 Integrated capability portfolios align stakeholders to identify capability gaps and eliminate unnecessary redundancies.

- Incremental modernization enables us to deliver new and improved capabilities by leveraging mature technologies, shortening development times, planning growth potential and acquiring in quantities that give us the greatest advantage while hedging against uncertainty.
- Army Force Generation processes synchronize the distribution of equipment
 to units providing increased readiness over time and delivering a steady and
 predictable supply of trained and ready modular forces. The Army has
 consolidated its materiel management process under a single command and
 designated U.S. Army Materiel Command as the Army's Lead Materiel
 Integrator. Additionally, we consolidated all of our materiel data into a single
 authoritative repository called the Logistics Information Warehouse.

These emerging systems and processes represent a powerful new approach for implementing the Army's equipping priorities, policies and programs to the meet new security demands of the 21st century. The equipment requested in the President's FY 13 Budget strikes a balance between current and future needs, provides the basis for an affordable equipping strategy over time, and takes into account Army requirements and priorities. In developing this request, the Army made difficult decisions to shift funds previously programmed for future capabilities to current needs. The decisions came at the expense of promising and needed technologies with capabilities that did not fit within resource limitations. The Army's top four modernization priorities are the Network, Ground Combat Vehicle, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle and Soldier Systems.

<u>Network</u> Also known as LandWarNet, the Network remains the Army's top investment priority. With expectations of tighter budgets and a still very active threat

environment, the Army will have to produce a force that is smaller yet more capable. The Network is the core of that smaller, capable Army.

The Army is conducting a series of semiannual field exercises known as the Network Integration Evaluation to evaluate, integrate and mature the Army's tactical network. The exercises will assess network and non-network capabilities to determine implications across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities. The process aligns several key Army network programs and advances the fusion of radio waveforms to form an integrated network baseline to which industry can build.

The foundation of the modernized Network is a Joint, secure and common architecture that will provide information from the cloud to enable leaders, units and the Institutional Army to function more effectively. The Army will extend this critical capability to its installations around the world. This capability will increase force effectiveness, facilitate transition for units and individuals from one phase of the Army Force Generation cycle to another and greatly improve network security.

The major programs that form the backbone of the tactical network are:

 the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical, which provides a real-time common operating picture down to the company level by extending satellite and line-of-sight communications, including telephone, data and video;

- the Joint Tactical Radio System, an advanced software-defined family of radios that will carry data and voice for dismounted troops and airborne and maritime platforms;
- the Distributed Common Ground System Army, which provides intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance data, as well as access to the entire
 Defense Intelligence Information Enterprise, to commanders from the company to Army service component command level;
- the Joint Battle Command Platform, which provides situational awareness data enhancing mission command to Army and Marine Corps tactical operations centers and combat vehicles; and
- Nett Warrior, which gives dismounted leaders integrated situational awareness and information sharing, helping them to avoid fratricide and increase combat effectiveness.

The Army Network must be dynamic to give Soldiers, Civilians and partners information and services when and where needed. Investment must be steady and wisely applied, while maintaining a strong partnership with industry.

Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) The Infantry Fighting Vehicle is reaching the limit of its capacity to receive technology upgrades proven critical for Soldiers in combat operations. The GCV is the Army's replacement program for the Infantry Fighting Vehicle and the centerpiece of the Army's overall combat vehicle investment strategy. It will be designed to deliver a full nine-man squad with improved survivability, mobility

and network integration, considered crucial to our ability to conduct fire and maneuver in close quarters fighting in complex terrain. The vehicle will also provide the growth potential necessary to accommodate advances in protection, networking and space, weight, power and cooling technologies while reducing sustainment demands. No current vehicle can sufficiently meet all these requirements.

The GCV acquisition strategy implements affordability measures designed to ensure the long-term success of the program as the Army faces constrained resources in the future. To develop this acquisition strategy, the Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense conducted a comprehensive review to make sure the program is both achievable and affordable within a 7-year timeframe. The model adopted for the GCV program incentivizes industry to use the best of mature technologies that are both affordable and support the 7-year timeframe. The Army has also paid close attention to risk reduction within the program by requiring industry to identify potential cost schedule and performance tradeoffs; provide cost targets throughout the GCV's life cycle; and maximize competition to support innovation, cost containment and schedule requirements.

Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) As a Joint Service program between the Army and Marine Corps, the JLTV will replace approximately one-third of the Army's oldest unarmored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV). The JLTV incorporates the strengths of the Mine-Resistant, Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles that the HMMWV family of vehicles does not provide. The HMMWV was not designed to be used as an armored combat vehicle, but it was often employed as one during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In contrast, the JLTV will be designed for this role from the outset. It will be capable of operating across the range of military operations and physical environments providing, improved mobility and protection for Soldiers. The JLTV balances protection, payload, performance and improved fuel efficiency in one

affordable and sustainable vehicle. It will also be fully integrated into the Network to enhance the effectiveness of ground forces.

Soldier Systems The squad is the foundation of the decisive force; it is the cornerstone of all units. To ensure the success of combat operations in the future, the Army will invest in systems that consider the squad as a team rather than a collection of individuals. This approach will guarantee that the squad will not be in a fair fight but will have overmatch. The Army will continue to invest in Soldier systems that enable the lethality, protection, situational awareness and mobility of the individual Soldier in his or her squad. These systems include small arms, night vision, Soldier sensors, body armor and individual clothing and equipment.

Summary and Conclusion

The Army has been, and will continue to be, a critical part of the Joint Force because land power remains the politically decisive form of warfare and is essential to America's national security strategy. No major conflict has ever been won without "boots on the ground." By being tasked to seize, occupy and defend land areas, as well as to defeat enemy land forces, the Army is unique because it must not only deploy and defeat an adversary, but must be prepared to remain in the region until the Nation's long-term strategic objectives are secured. Indeed, the insertion of ground troops is the most tangible and durable measure of America's commitment to defend our interests, protect our friends and defeat our enemies.

With global trends pointing to further instability, our Army remains a key guardian of our national security. In the wake of the Cold War, it was said that we had reached the "end of history," and that liberal democracy had won the ideological competition. However, events since then make it clear that potential adversaries with competing ideologies still exist and are extremely dangerous.

As a result, we find ourselves in an increasingly uncertain world, with threats ranging from terrorist and cyberattacks to regional instability to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. For our Army that means we will likely have to deal with near peer competitors in niche areas and hybrid threats that mix regular, irregular and criminal activity—all while still facing the possibility of a conventional force-on-force conflict.

The danger extends from the homeland to the theater where combat operations might occur. Conflict is the norm; a stable peace the exception. In such a world, our adversaries will adapt to gain advantage, especially in the land domain. And it is on land, that our challenges will be the most complex because of dynamic human relationships and terrain variables.

While the Army's new end-strength numbers allow it to support current defense priorities, it is imperative that the Army draw down end-strength levels in a smart and responsible manner. We believe that our new end-strength provides us with the flexibility to retain the hard-won expertise it has gained over the last decade. To be sure, the Army has faced similar challenges before. After every major conflict since the Revolutionary War, the Army has faced pressure to decrease its end-strength. As recently as 2001 (pre-9/11), many believed a strategic shift was needed and that the future of modern warfare would be about missile defense, satellites and high-tech weaponry because no adversary would dare challenge America's conventional forces. But whenever we have rushed to radically diminish the position of the Army, the result has always been the same: an excessive decline in effectiveness at a cost of blood and treasure.

Decreases after World War I directly contributed to failures at Kasserine Pass.

Decreases after World War II led to Task Force Smith's failure in Korea. More recently,

the end of the Cold War demonstrated our Nation's need for agile, adaptable and decisive ground forces to conduct a wide range of operations. These numerous missions include Operation Provide Comfort in Iraq, Joint Task Force Andrew in Florida, Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Operation Joint Guardian in Kosovo. What they have in common is that they were unforeseen, thus emphasizing our need to avoid the historical pattern of drawing down too fast.

America's leaders face difficult choices as they chart the way ahead for our Nation. Familiar external threats persist and complex new challenges will emerge. Concurrently, fiscal limitations create internal challenges for our leaders. America's Army is prepared to fulfill its role in keeping the Nation secure. The Army will *prevent* conflict by remaining a credible force with sufficient capacity to dissuade adversaries from challenging American interests. The Army will *shape* the environment, building positive relationships and capabilities that enable nations to effectively protect and govern their citizenry. Finally, when called, the Army will fight for the Nation and *win* decisively. We understand these responsibilities and resolve not to reduce the size of the Army in a manner that does not permit us to reverse the process should demand for forces increase dramatically.

As we look ahead, the Army is focusing on three areas. Our first priority remains supporting operations in Afghanistan. We will guard against becoming distracted by the future at the risk of our men and women who remain in harm's way.

Second, we will be the very best stewards we can, because America's resources are too precious to waste. Transforming the Institutional Army, reforming our acquisition process and ensuring energy security are essential for us to protect the resources provided by Congress and the American people.

Third, we will fight to incorporate principles and processes that preserve readiness and capability while reducing the size of the Army. We are adjusting our formations to build the right number of units with the right capability to meet the needs of the Joint Force. The past 10 years have taught us that an operational reserve force is essential to accomplish our missions and expand rapidly when required. We will invest deliberately and wisely in our Soldiers, Civilians and Families to make sure they are prepared and supported. We will treat those who have served in our ranks with respect and honor. Our wounded Soldiers will receive the very best care the Nation can provide, and our Soldiers who return to civilian life will be well prepared to do so.

Future threats will demand enhanced capabilities for our Soldiers, so we will modernize our equipment. The Army has identified four programs to highlight. The Network gives sight, sound and awareness to our Soldiers, Civilians and leaders to defeat our adversaries. The Ground Combat Vehicle and Joint Light Tactical Vehicle will incorporate hard won lessons in Iraq and Afghanistan to provide the mobility and protection our Soldiers require. Investments in Soldier Systems improve our Soldiers' ability to move, fight and survive on the battlefield.

The Army has chosen its focus areas carefully and deliberately because they will enable us to provide the what Nation needs. We owe it to America and to the American Soldier, the Nation's servant and warrior—the Strength of the Nation!

2012 Reserve Component Addendum to the Army Posture Statement

Sections 517 and 519 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 1994 require the information in this addendum. Section 517 requires a report relating to implementation of the pilot Program for Active Component Support of the Reserves under Section 414 of the NDAA 1992 and 1993. Section 519 requires a detailed presentation concerning the Army National Guard (ARNG), including information relating to implementation of the ARNG Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992 (Title XI of Public Law 102-484, referred to in this addendum as ANGCRRA). Section 704 of the NDAA amended Section 519 reporting. Included is the U.S. Army Reserve information using Section 519 reporting criteria. The data included in the report is information that was available 30 September 2011.

Section 517 (b) (2) (A). The promotion rate for officers considered for promotion from within the promotion zone who are serving as active component advisors to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance with that program) compared with the promotion rate for other officers considered for promotion from within the promotion zone in the same pay grade and the same competitive category, shown for all officers of the Army.

	AC in RC (%)*	Army Average (%) **
FY 2010		
Major	(57 of 67) 85.1%	92.1%
Lieutenant Colonel	(10 of 12) 83.3%	88.7%
FY 2011		
Major	(73 of 86) 84.9%	93.3 %
Lieutenant Colonel	(6 of 11) 54.5%	86.8 %

^{*}Active component officers serving in reserve component assignments at time of consideration.

Section 517 (b) (2) (B). The promotion rate for officers considered for promotion from below the promotion zone who are serving as active component advisors to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance with that program) compared in the same manner as specified in subparagraph (A) (the paragraph above).

^{**}Active component officers not serving in reserve component assignments at the time of consideration.

	AC in RC (%) *	Army Average (%) **
FY 2010		
Major	(6 of 123) 4.9%	5.7%
Lieutenant Colonel	(0 of 7) 0.0%	10.7%
FY 2011		
Major	(3 of 57) 5.3%	8.7 %
Lieutenant Colonel	(0 of 10) 0.0%	3.5 %

^{*}Below the zone active component officers serving in reserve component assignments at time of consideration.

Section 519(b)

1. The number and percentage of officers with at least two years of active-duty before becoming a member of the Army National Guard or the US Army Reserve Selected Reserve units.

ARNG officers: 21,425 or 49.2 percent of which 1,429 were FY 11 accessions

Army Reserve officers: 9,888 or 33 percent of which 389 were FY 11 accessions.

2. The number and percentage of enlisted personnel with at least two years of active-duty before becoming a member of the Army National Guard or the U.S. Army Reserve Selected Reserve units.

ARNG enlisted: 95,375 or 30 percent of which 7, 243 were FY 11 accessions.

^{**}Below-the-zone active component officers not serving in reserve component assignments at time of consideration.

Army Reserve enlisted: 35,796 or 21 percent of which 3,524 were FY 11 accessions.

- 3. The number of officers who are graduates of one of the service academies and were released from active duty before the completion of their active-duty service obligation and, of those officers:
 - a. The number who are serving the remaining period of their active-duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRA:

In FY 11, there was one Service Academy graduate released from active duty before completing their obligation to serve in the Army Reserve.

b. The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRA, together with the reason for each waiver:

In FY 11, under section 1112(a) (2) of ANGCRRA the Secretary of the Amy granted no waivers to the Army National Guard.

In FY 11, under section 1112(a) (2) of ANGCRRA the Secretary of the Army granted one waiver to the Army Reserve. The waiver provided the Soldier an opportunity to play a professional sport and complete service obligation.

4. The number of officers who were commissioned as distinguished Reserve Officers' Training Corps graduates and were released from active duty before the completion of their active-duty service obligation and, of those officers: a. The number who are serving the remaining period of their active-duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRA:

In FY 11, there were no distinguished Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) graduates serving the remaining period of their active-duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve.

b. The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRA, together with the reason for each waiver:

In FY 11, the Secretary of the Army granted no waivers.

5. The number of officers who are graduates of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps program and who are performing their minimum period of obligated service in accordance with section 1112(b) of ANGCRRA by a combination of (a) two years of active duty, and (b) such additional period of service as is necessary to complete the remainder of such obligation served in the National Guard and, of those officers, the number for whom permission to perform their minimum period of obligated service in accordance with that section was granted during the preceding fiscal year:

In FY 11, there were no graduates released early from an active-duty obligation.

6. The number of officers for whom recommendations were made during the preceding fiscal year for a unit vacancy promotion to a grade above First Lieutenant, and of those recommendations, the number and percentage that were concurred in by an active duty officer under section 1113(a) of ANGCRRA, shown separately for each of the three categories of officers set forth in section 1113(b) of ANGCRRA (with Army Reserve data also reported).

There are no longer active and reserve component associations affiliated with ARNG vacancy promotion due to operational mission requirements and deployment tempo. Active component officers no longer concur or non-concur with unit vacancy promotion recommendations for officers in associated units according to section 1113(a). However, unit vacancy promotion boards have active component representation.

In FY 11, the ARNG recommended 4,286 Officers for a position-vacancy promotion and promoted 2,318.

In FY 11, the Army Reserve recommended 85 officers for a position-vacancy promotion and promoted 85.

7. The number of waivers during the preceding fiscal year under section 1114(a) of ANGCRRA of any standard prescribed by the Secretary establishing a military education requirement for non-commissioned officers and the reason for each such waiver.

In FY 11, the ARNG had a total of 44 Soldiers that received a military education waiver. The waivers were granted based on non-completion of the Warrior Leader Course (WLC) due to assignment to a Warrior Transition Unit (WTU) ("medical hold" or "medical hold-over" units); and non-completion of the Advanced Leader Course or Senior Leader Course due to deployment or training schedule constraints.

In FY 11, the Army Reserve had a total of 257 Soldiers who received a military education waiver. Of these, 89 were SGTs in need of a waiver for WLC as a result of being deployed or assigned to WTUs (medical hold or medical hold-over units) because of a medical condition incurred in direct support of Contingency Operations while otherwise eligible for promotion, if recommended. Furthermore, 155 waivers for Advanced Leaders Course (ALC) and 13 waivers for Senior Leader Course (SLC) were granted to Soldiers otherwise eligible for consideration but lacking the prerequisite level of Non Commissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) schooling as a direct result of operational deployment conflicts or inability of the Army to schedule the course.

The Secretary of the Army has delegated the authority for the waivers referred to in section 114(a) of ANGCRRA to the Director, ARNG and to the Commander, U.S Army Reserve Command. The National Guard Bureau and the U.S. Army Reserve Command maintain details for each waiver.

8. The number and distribution by grade, shown for each State, of personnel in the initial entry training and non-deployability personnel accounting category established under section 1115 of ANGCRRA for members of the Army National Guard who have not completed the minimum training required for deployment or who are otherwise not available for deployment. (Included is a narrative summary of information pertaining to the Army Reserve.)

In FY 11, the ARNG had 49,454 Soldiers considered non-deployable for reasons outlined in Army Regulation 220-1, Unit Status Reporting (e.g., initial entry training; medical issues; medical non-availability; pending administrative or legal discharge; separation; officer transition; non-participation or restrictions on the use or possession of weapons and ammunition under the Lautenberg Amendment). The National Guard Bureau (NGB) maintains the detailed information.

In FY 11, the Army Reserve had 34,180 Soldiers considered non-deployable for reasons outlined in Army Regulation 220-1, Unit Status Reporting (e.g., initial entry training; medical issues; medical non-availability; pending administrative or legal discharge; separation; officer transition; non-participation or restrictions on the use or possession of weapons and ammunition under the Lautenberg Amendment). The U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) maintains the detailed information.

9. The number of members of the Army National Guard, shown for each State, that were discharged during the previous fiscal year pursuant to section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRA for not completing the minimum training required for deployment within 24 months after entering the National Guard. (Army Reserve data also reported.)

A total of 445 ARNG Soldiers, with at least 24 months time in ARNG, were losses in FY 11 due to lack of minimum required military education. The breakdown is 265 enlisted and 180 officers.

The number of Army Reserve Soldiers discharged during FY11 for not completing the minimum training required for deployment within 24 months after entering the Army Reserve is 24 officers and five enlisted Soldiers. Under AR 135-175, Separation of Officers, separation actions are necessary for officers who have not completed a basic branch course within 36 months after commissioning. Under AR 135-178, Separation of Enlisted Personnel, separation actions are necessary for Soldiers who have not completed the required initial entry training within the first 24 months.

10. The number of waivers, shown for each State, that were granted by the Secretary of the Army during the previous fiscal year under section 1115(c)(2) of ANGCRRA of the requirement in section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRA described in paragraph (9), together with the reason for each waiver.

In FY 11, there were no waivers granted Secretary of the Army to the Army National Guard under section 1115(c)(2) of ANGCRRA of the requirement in section 1115(c)(1) of NGCRRA described in paragraph (9).

In FY 11, there were 210 waivers granted by the Chief, Army Reserve. The Army Reserve was delegated the authority to grant waivers for personnel who did not complete the minimum training required for deployment within 24 months after entering the Army Reserve. The reasons for waivers were categorized as Hardship, Medical or Administrative (i.e. Failed Height/Weight Standards, Failed to Obtain Driver License, Accepted ROTC Scholarship, Temporary Disqualified, and Failed to Complete High School).

11. The number of Army National Guard members, shown for each State, (and the number of AR members), who were screened during the preceding fiscal year to determine whether they meet minimum physical profile standards required for deployment and, of those members: (a) the number

and percentage who did not meet minimum physical profile standards for deployment; and (b) the number and percentage who were transferred pursuant to section 1116 of ANGCRRA to the personnel accounting category described in paragraph (8).

a. The number and percentage who did not meet minimum physical profile standards required for deployment:

In FY 11, 256, 696 ARNG Soldiers underwent a Periodic Health Assessment (PHA). There were 14, 305 (3.9 percent of the Soldiers who underwent PHA) personnel identified for review due to a profile-limiting condition or failure to meet retention standards.

In FY 11, 124,785 Army Reserve Soldiers underwent a Periodic Health Assessment (PHA). There were 14,948 (12 percent of the Soldiers who underwent PHA) personnel identified for review due to a profile limiting condition or failure to meet retention standards.

b. The number and percentage that transferred pursuant to section 1116 of ANGCRRA to the personnel accounting category described in paragraph (8).

In FY 11, the ARNG transferred all 14,305 Soldiers to a medically non-deployable status who were identified for a review due to a profile limiting condition or failure to meet retention standards.

In FY 11, the Army Reserve transferred 15,826 Soldiers to a medically non-deployable status who were identified for a review due to a profile limiting condition or failure to meet retention standards.

On 23 August 2010, Department of the Army implemented Medical Readiness Categories (MRC) per AR 40-501 which replaced Fully Medically Ready (FMR) as the metric for measuring Individual Medical Readiness (IMR) in the Army. This new way of measuring medical readiness by classifying Soldiers into MRC reduced the number of Soldiers considered medically not ready in the ARNG in FY 11. Soldiers previously listed as not "Fully Medically Ready" because they didn't have current immunizations, medical warning tags, DNA, and a current HIV test on file are now considered "Medically Ready" and identified as MRC 2 (which is correctable within

72 hours). The data is generated from MEDPROS, the medical readiness database of record for the Army.

12. The number of members and the percentage total membership of the Army National Guard shown for each State who underwent a medical screening during the previous fiscal year as provided in section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

13. The number of members and the percentage of the total membership of the Army National Guard shown for each State who underwent a dental screening during the previous fiscal year as provided in section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

14. The number of members and the percentage of the total membership of the Army National Guard shown for each State, over the age of 40 who underwent a full physical examination during the previous fiscal year for purposes of section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

15. The number of units of the Army National Guard that are scheduled for early deployment in the event of a mobilization, and of those units, the number that are dentally ready for deployment in accordance with section 1118 of ANGCRRA.

Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1118 of ANGCRRA.

16. The estimated post-mobilization training time for each Army National Guard combat unit (and Army Reserve unit), and a description, displayed in broad categories and by State of what training would need to be accomplished for Army National Guard combat units (and Army Reserve units) in a post-mobilization period for purposes of section 1119 of ANGCRRA.

The January 19, 2007 Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Utilization of the Total Force," limited reserve component unit mobilizations to 400-day periods, including 30-days post-mobilization leave, and five days out-processing. The most significant impact of this policy change to the Army National Guard is the inclusion of post-mobilization training time during the 400-day mobilization period.

Timely alert for mobilizations—at least one year prior—is crucial to the Army National Guard's mission success. Under the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model, many training tasks previously conducted during the post-mobilization phase now occur in local training areas before mobilization. First Army, in CONUS, manages and directs post-mobilization training for reserve component conventional forces. First Army, in theater, conducts the theater-specified training required and confirms the readiness of mobilized units waiting to deploy.

Army National Guard training and Army Reserve training complies with the ARFORGEN model of progressive training over multi-year cycles and reflects the Army Training Strategy. Units move through the ARFORGEN cycle in three force pools (reset, train/ready, and available). Training progresses through these force pools with the initial focus on individual and leader training, migrating to low-level unit and battle staff, and finally culminating in multi-echelon, combined-arms exercises in the Ready year.

All ARNG units are "Combat Units." Forces Command Pre-Deployment Training, in support of Combatant Commands' guidance, identifies four categories of deploying units:

- Category (CAT) 1 includes units that would rarely, if ever, travel off a Contingency Operating Base/Forward Operating Base (COB/FOB)
- CAT 2 includes units that will, or potentially will, travel off a COB/FOB for short durations
- CAT 3 includes units that travel and conduct the majority of their missions off a COB/FOB
- CAT 4 consists of maneuver units with an Area of Operations (such as Brigade Combat Teams).

The pre-mobilization tasks increase by category, up to CAT 4. A unit's post-mobilization training time depends on the number of the pre-mobilization tasks completed during pre-mobilization. Army goals for post-mobilization training for reserve component headquarters and combat support/combat service support units range from 15 to 45 days, depending on the type and category of the unit (note: this time does not include administrative and travel days). Any pre-mobilization tasks not completed during the pre-mobilization phase must be completed at a mobilization station. The ARNG typically sends units to a mobilization station with a pre-mobilization task completion rate of 90-95 percent. Smaller ARNG units typically arrive at mobilization station 100 percent complete.


Post-mobilization training conducted by First Army typically consists of:

- theater orientation
- rules of engagement and escalation-of-force training
- counterinsurgency operations

- counter-improvised-explosive-device training
- convoy live-fire exercises
- completion of any theater-specified training not completed during the premobilization period

Post-mobilization training days for a CAT 4 unit range from 50-65 days training at mobilization station. This training supports a Combat Training Center culminating training event during post-mobilization that a CAT 4 unit is required to perform in order to be validated and deployed (National Training Center or Joint Readiness Training Center; 30 day training exercises).

Below is an outline depicting post-mobilization training day goals for various units:



40

The outline below depicts the actual number of post-mobilization training days for various units:*

	Post Mobilization Training Days		
	Current	Goal	Delta
I/H/S Brigade Combat Team	63	45	18
Combat Aviation Brigade	33	60	-27
Military Police (Internment/Resettlement)	27	40	-13
Engineer Battalion (Route Clearance)	37	40	-3
Military Police Company	30	40	-10
Quartermaster Company	23	15	8
Engineer Company (Construction)	29	40	-11
Transportation Company (Heavy Equip Trans)	37	40	-3

^{*} from First Army-approved Post-Mobilization Training Plans.

The Army Reserve (AR) Command in conjunction with First Army (1A), Forces Command (FORSCOM) and Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) are in the process of transitioning the business rules for pre and post mobilization training for AR formations deploying in support of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). This is motivated in order to meet the intent behind FRAGO 4 to HQDA EXORD 150-08 (RC Deployment Expeditionary Force (DEF) Pre and Post-Mobilization Training Strategy), the January 19, 2007 SECDEF Memorandum, "Utilization of the Total Force" and the August 04, 2011 Secretary of the Army Memorandum, "Army Deployment Period Policy."

Both the current and projected models are listed below, but both exclude all individual skills training, to include PME, MOSQ and functional training. The bulk of Individual skills training will remain a pre-mobilization requirement and would consist of 24 days of Inactive Duty Training, 15-29 days of Annual TrainingT for Collective Training, and, under the current model, 21 additional days of Active Duty Training individual training (Army Warrior Tasks (AWTs), Theater Specific Required Training (TSRT)). Under the

projected model, the 21 additional days would be eliminated. Some formations, under the current model, used up to 74 days pre-mobilization to obtain a T2 rating prior to mobilization and up to 60 days post-mobilization to achieve a T1 rating. Below is an average of current pre and post-mobilization training models which will expire September 30, 2012. To reduce the demand on soldiers in a pre-mobilization status, First Army will assume the training responsibility for many of the AWTs and TSRT on October 1, 2012. AR units will mobilize at no less than a T3 rating. The shift in training strategy is for DEF units only and will increase current post-mobilization days by a projected ten days.

Current Model

Category (CAT)*	AVG Pre-MOB	AVG Post-MOB TNG	AVG Total Post-MOB
1	65 days	17 days	30 days
2	60 days	22 days	34 days
3	56 days	33 days	46 days

Projected Model

Category (CAT)*	Average Pre-MOB	AVG Post-MOB TNG	AVG Total Post-
			MOB**
1	39-45	27 days	40 days
2	39-45	32 days	44 days
3	39-45	43 days	56 days

^{*}No CAT 4 formations in the AR

17. A description of the measures taken during the preceding fiscal year to comply with the requirement in section 1120 of ANGCRRA to expand the use of simulations, simulators, and advanced training devices and technologies for members and units of the Army National Guard (and the Army Reserve).

During FY 11, the ARNG continued to synchronize the use of existing and ongoing live, virtual, and constructive training aids, devices, simulations and simulators (TADSS) programs with the training requirements of the ARFORGEN training model. By

^{**}Some formations may require up to 70 days post-MOB to achieve T1 and satisfy COCOM requirements.

synchronizing the use of TADSS with ARFORGEN, the ARNG continues to improve unit training proficiency prior to mobilization.

To support the training requirements of M1A1 Abrams and M2A2 Bradley equipped Brigade Combat Teams (BCT's) the ARNG is continuing to field and train using the Conduct of Fire Trainer- Situation Awareness (COFT-SA) and the Mobile-Conduct of Fire Trainer Situation Awareness (M-COFT-SA). Due to the geographical dispersion of units, the ARNG has developed the M-COFT-SA trainer as a mobile solution to fulfill training gaps. The ARNG continued fielding Tabletop Full-Fidelity Trainers and is fielding the Bradley Advanced Training System (BATS) for the M2A2 units. When fully fielded, these devices, in addition to the Conduct of Fire Trainer Advanced Gunnery Trainer System (CAGTS) will be the primary simulation trainers to meet the virtual gunnery requirements of M1A1 and M2A2/A3 crews.

In order to train all ARNG units on the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) of convoy operations and meet unstabilized gunnery requirements, the ARNG has fielded the Virtual Convoy Operations Trainer (VCOT). The VCOT, through the use of software databases, provides commanders with a unique and critical mission rehearsal tool. In addition, the ARNG has added an Individual Gunnery Trainer (IGT) to train individual and crew drills for .50 caliber and MK19 unstabilized gunnery tasks listed in the HBCT gunnery manual. Currently, all 54 States and Territories have received the VCOT capability. The IGT is an initiative that is currently being fielded; to date 140 IGT systems have been fielded to ARNG units.

The ARNG is currently fielding the Operation Driver Simulator that trains transportation tasks in a family of vehicles, at both the unit and institutional levels.

The ARNG has just completed the Army Training Support Command directed upgrades to the Call For Fire Trainer II (CFFT II). The CFFT II trains Artillery Soldiers and observers of indirect fires on critical skills prior to live fire requirements.

To meet basic and advanced rifle marksmanship requirements, the ARNG is continuing to field the Engagement Skills Trainer (EST 2000). This system is the Army's approved marksmanship training device. The ARNG is also continuing the use of its previously

procured Fire Arms Training System (FATS) until EST 2000 fielding is completed. The EST 2000 and FATS also provides static unit collective gunnery and tactical training, and shoot/don't shoot training. The Army is currently rewriting the strategy for the EST 2000 to include the ARNG initiative of the mobile EST to accommodate the geographical troop dispersion of the ARNG. These systems also support units conducting vital homeland defense missions.

The ARNG supplements its marksmanship-training strategy with the Laser Marksmanship Training System (LMTS). The use of LMTS helps to develop and maintain basic marksmanship skills, diagnose and correct problems, and assess basic and advanced skills. The ARNG has over 900 systems fielded down to the company level. The LMTS is a laser-based training device that replicates the firing of the Soldier's weapon without live ammunition.

The Improvised Explosive Device Effects Simulator (IEDES) supports the training requirements for the detection, reaction, classification, prevention, and reporting of Improvised Explosive Devices. The IEDES kits consist of pyrotechnic and/or non-pyrotechnic training devices to achieve scalable signature effects. The ARNG is currently fielded 258 total IEDES kits, of which, 194 are non-pyrotechnic kits (A-kits) and 64 are pyrotechnic kits (B-kits). This distribution includes 53 ARNG training sites across 39 states and territories. They have received fielding, New Equipment Training (NET) and life cycle sustainment as of 3rd Quarter FY12. ARNG-TRS is continuing the effort to identify and fill requirements based on the recently completed (1st Quarter, 2012) Training Aids, Devices, Simulations, and Simulators (TADSS) Mission Essential Requirements (MER) review. The latest IEDES innovation is the fielding of the IEDES Transit Cases to support less than company size training scenarios.

The ARNG continues to develop its battle command training capability through the Mission Command Training Support Program (MCTSP). This program provides live, virtual, constructive, and gaming (LVC&G) training support at unit home stations via mobile training teams. Units can also train at Mission Training Complexes (MTC). The MCTSP consists of three MTCs at Camp Dodge, Iowa; Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania; and Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and a regional Distributed Mission Support Team (DMST). The Army Campaign Plan 2011 requires the ARNG to train 172 units (Brigade equivalents and above). The MCTSP synchronizes ARNG mission command training capabilities to help units plan, prepare, and execute battle staff

training. The objective is to develop proficient battle command staffs and trained operators during pre- mobilization training.

In order to provide the critical culminating training event for the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) ARFORGEN Cycle, the ARNG has implemented the Exportable Combat Training Capability (XCTC) Program. The ARNG XCTC program provides Battalion Battle Staff training to the level organized, coupled with a theater immersed, mission focused training event to certify company level proficiency prior to entering the ARFORGEN Available Force Pool defined as Certified Company Proficiency with demonstrated Battalion Battle Staff proficiency, competent leaders, and trained Soldiers prepared for success on the battlefield.

The Army Reserve continues to develop its ability to integrate live, virtual, constructive and gaming training aids, devices, simulations and simulators (TADSS) programs with the Army Reserve Training Strategy in order to meet established aim points in our ARFORGEN training model. TADSS play an essential role in our collective training exercises on our installations which help support our transition from a strategic to an operational Army Reserve and meet our ARGORGEN aim point of providing units at T2 readiness in the Available year. Just as critical, TADSS also support our individual Soldier training at home station, local training areas, and institutions. By synchronizing the use of TADSS with ARFORGEN, the Army Reserve continues to improve unit training proficiency and ensures we meet our requirement to provide the combatant commanders with trained units and proficient battle staffs.

The Warrior and Combat Support Training Exercises are the Army Reserve's major collective training exercises conducted on Army Reserve installations. These exercises integrate live and constructive environments to train senior battle staffs while lower echelon units conduct company and platoon lanes. The Army Reserve has made sizable investments in improving the facility infrastructure at Fort Hunter Liggett and Fort McCoy to support the use of TADSS in these and future exercises. The 75th Mission Command Training Division is utilizing the Entity-level Resolution Federation to provide a high resolution (e.g., individual Soldier-level fidelity aggregated to unit resolutions) joint constructive battle staff training simulation.

The Army Reserve also utilizes TADSS to assist individual Soldiers in maintaining their technical and tactical proficiency. These TADSS assist Soldiers in training on individual pieces of equipment and in sharpening their battlefield skills.

Low-density simulators continue to be employed to reduce expensive "live" time for unique combat service support equipment. For example, Army Reserve watercraft units train on the Maritime Integrated Training System (MITS), a bridge simulator that not only trains vessel captains but the entire crew of Army watercraft. Other simulators include locomotive simulators used by Army Reserve railroad units and a barge derrick simulator for transportation terminal units.

Use of the Laser Marksmanship Training System (LMTS) and Engagement Skills Trainer 2000 (EST 2000) remain essential elements of the Army Reserve marksmanship training strategy. During FY 11, the Army Reserve fielded more than 529 LMTS to 396 Army Reserve facilities to support home station basic marksmanship training for individual and crew served weapons. The system allows the Soldier to use their assigned weapon, as well as crew served weapons, in a simulation/training mode. In FY 11, the Army Reserve also fielded the EST 2000 to 21 Army Reserve facilities. The EST 2000 provides initial and sustainment marksmanship training, static unit collective gunnery and tactical training, and shoot/don't shoot training.

18. Summary tables of unit readiness, shown for each State, (and for the Army Reserve), and drawn from the unit readiness rating system as required by section 1121 of ANGCRRA, including the personnel readiness rating information and the equipment readiness assessment information required by that section, together with:

a. Explanations of the information:

Readiness tables are classified and can be provided upon request. The Department of the Army, G-3, maintains this information. The states do not capture this data. The information is maintained in the Defense Readiness Reporting System – Army.

b. Based on the information shown in the tables, the Secretary's overall assessment of the deployability of units of the ARNG (and Army Reserve), including a discussion of personnel deficiencies and equipment shortfalls in accordance with section 1121:

Summary tables and overall assessments are classified and can be provided upon request. The Department of the Army, G-3, maintains this information. The information is maintained in the Defense Readiness Reporting System – Army.

- 19. Summary tables, shown for each State (and Army Reserve), of the results of inspections of units of the Army National Guard (and Army Reserve) by inspectors general or other commissioned officers of the Regular Army under the provisions of Section 105 of Title 32, together with explanations of the information shown in the tables, and including display of:
 - a. The number of such inspections;
 - b. Identification of the entity conducting each inspection;
 - c. The number of units inspected; and
 - d. The overall results of such inspections, including the inspector's determination for each inspected unit of whether the unit met deployability standards and, for those units not meeting deployability standards, the reasons for such failure and the status of corrective actions.

During FY 11, Inspectors General and other commissioned officers of the Regular Army conducted 1,219 inspections of the Army National Guard. Regular Army Officers assigned to the respective States and Territories as Inspectors General executed the bulk of these inspections (959). Of the remaining 126 inspections, the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM),

and other external inspection agencies conducted 104. Because the inspections conducted by Inspectors General focused on findings and recommendations, the units involved in these inspections were not provided with a pass/fail rating. Results of these inspections may be requested for release through the Inspector General of the Army.

The Army Reserve Office of the Inspector General conducted two assessments within the last 12 months. The first was entitled Property Accountability within the Army Reserve (Directed by the Chief, Army Reserve (CAR)) on 25 January 2011 and final report approved on 11 August 2011). The second assessment entitled Special Assessment of Personnel Transition within the Army Reserve was directed by the CAR on 11 August 2011 and is ongoing (expected final report approval in March 2012). The Army Reserve Office of the Inspector General conducted both assessments. The Army Reserve Inspection General assessed 30 units for Property Accountability. As of 13 December 2011, 33 units have been assessed as part of the Personnel Transitions Assessment. The overall goal of both assessments was not to evaluate the unit's deployability status. However, out of the total 66 units assessed nothing was found that would cause a unit to be listed as non-deployable. Results of these inspections may be requested for release through the Inspector General of the Army.

20. A listing, for each ARNG combat unit (and US Army Reserve FSP units) of the active-duty combat units (and other units) associated with that ARNG (and US Army Reserve) unit in accordance with section 1131(a) of ANGCRRA, shown by State, for each such ARNG unit (and for the US Army Reserve) by: (A) the assessment of the commander of that associated active-duty unit of the manpower, equipment, and training resource requirements of that National Guard (and Army Reserve) unit in accordance with section 1131(b)(3) of the ANGCRRA; and (B) the results of the validation by the commander of that associated active-duty unit of the compatibility of that National Guard (or US Army Reserve) unit with active duty forces in accordance with section 1131(b)(4) of ANGCRRA.

While the methods employed by the Army to manage the active component (AC) support to reserve component (RC) readiness have changed during the last ten years of persistent conflict, we have met the intent of the Congress as outlined in Title XI of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1993, as amended. Every RC unit that deployed during FY 11 was properly manned, equipped, trained, and certified to meet Combatant Commander (CCDR) requirements prior to employment overseas and in the Continental

United States (CONUS) by supporting processes associated with the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process.

The Army began its transformation from large, fixed organizations (divisions and corps) to a modular, brigade-centric organization in 2004. At the same time, and while engaged in persistent conflict, it began transforming the way it executes the training and readiness of modular units – both AC and RC – to meet CCDR requirements. As such, modular force transformation and the implementation of the ARFORGEN process precludes a response in the format directed by Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 10542.

The formal training relationships previously established by the AC/RC Association Program outlined in U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) Regulation 350-4, Active Component (AC)/Reserve Component (RC) Partnerships, were modified as the requirements of ongoing Overseas Contingency Operations kept AC units in frequent deployments and RC units in frequent mobilization. The deployment tempo problem was solved within the Army's Training Support XXI program by using designated, fully functional, AC-led multi-component organizations to provide the necessary contact with mobilizing RC units. Since FORSCOM Regulation 350-4 no longer reflected the way the AC partnered with RC units, FORSCOM discontinued its use on 21 July 2010. The legislated roles and responsibilities formerly given to the commanders of associated AC units listed in Appendices B and C of that regulation are now executed by the commanders of First Army (FORSCOM's executive agent for Active Army support for the training, readiness, and mobilization of conventional RC units in the Continental United States); the 196th Infantry Brigade (U.S. Army Pacific's executive agent for the training and readiness of conventional RC units located in the Pacific Command's area of responsibility); and the U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) for the training and readiness of conventional RC units located in the European Command's area of responsibility.

In 2011, the Army published Army Regulation (AR) 525-29, *Army Force Generation*, which institutes the structured progression of unit readiness over time to produce trained, ready, and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment in support of CCDR and other Army requirements. This regulation was a collaborative effort between FORSCOM, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, the Army National Guard, and the U.S. Army Reserve Command to meet the progressive readiness demands of an Army engaged in persistent conflict. Within ARFORGEN, all rotational active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve units cycle through three ARFORGEN force pools – Reset, Train/Ready, and Available – and are designated either for deployment

to a validated CCDR operational requirement as a Deployment Expeditionary Force (DEF) or for the execution of a contingency mission, operational plan, or other validated Army requirement as a Contingency Expeditionary Force (CEF).

For the RC, this pertains to all modular division headquarters, brigade combat teams, multifunctional and functional support brigades (headquarters only), as well as modular units at the battalion to detachment level that comprise the critical enablers for operational missions. Assessments of the manpower, equipment, and training resource requirements of these RC units and validation of their compatibility with AC forces (as required by sections 1131(b)(3) and 1131(b)(4) of the Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992) are executed and maintained by First Army, the 196th Infantry Brigade, and USAREUR as the RC unit progresses through the ARFORGEN process into the deployment window.

Fiscal Year 2011 also found the Army at an inflection point in which strategic conditions have signaled a future change in demand across the range of military operations (DEF to CEF). The RC will figure prominently in the Army's response to these changes. ARFORGEN is the process that will produce trained and ready RC units that are organized, manned, trained, and equipped, as integral members of the Total Force, compatible with their AC counterparts, to provide predictable, recurring and sustainable capabilities for the Nation's security requirements. The Army does not foresee a return to the legacy construct of associated units.

21. A specification of the active-duty personnel assigned to units of the

Selected Reserve pursuant to section 414(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (10 USC. 261 note), shown (a) by State for the Army National Guard (and for the US Army Reserve), (b) by rank of officers, warrant officers, and enlisted members assigned, and (c) by unit or other organizational entity of assignment.

Title XI (FY 11) Authorizations				
	OFF	ENL	WO	TOTAL
U.S. Army Reserve	97	110	8	215
TRADOC	50	3	0	53
FORSCOM	1033	2165	101	3299
USARPAC	30	49	1	80
TOTAL	1210	2327	110	3647

Title XI (FY 11) Assigned				
	OFF	ENL	WO	TOTAL
U.S. Army Reserve	12	18	0	30
TRADOC	36	3	0	39
FORSCOM	696	1925	102	2723
USARPAC	30	41	9	80
TOTAL	774	1987	111	2872

As of September 30, 2011, the Army had 2,872 active component Soldiers assigned to Title XI positions. In FY06, the Army began reducing authorizations in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act 2005 (Public Laws 108-767, Section 515). Army G-1 and U.S. Army Human Resources Command carefully manages the authorizations and fill of Title XI positions. The data is not managed or captured by state – the chart above provides the best representation of how Title XI positions are dispersed and utilized.